No First Use

Victor Thuronyi
4 min readMar 5, 2021

Most of the headlines we see about nuclear weapons have to do with proliferation (Korea, Iran) or our relationship with Russia. Insufficiently discussed are the huge amounts of money being spent on nuclear weapons by the U.S. — money that could certainly be spent more productively elsewhere, or given back as tax cuts — or the ongoing danger from nuclear war. Nuclear war seems like a remote, unthinkable possibility, but the same was true for a pandemic virus in the minds of most Americans before we actually faced this reality.

A nuclear war would be several orders of magnitude worse than the coronavirus. Yet most people give it little thought. There may even be a sense that America’s nuclear weapons are keeping us safe, but nothing could be further from the truth. These weapons present an ongoing risk of nuclear devastation that could arise from miscalculation, mistake, or some cataclysm of events. What can be done to reduce this risk?

Reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons will not be easy, partly because it requires agreement from countries that are not inclined to be cooperative. The arms industry also wields huge political power. Political gridlock makes it difficult to pass legislation or approve treaties. But there is an important step that President Biden can take unilaterally, by simply signing an executive order. This would be a no-first-use declaration. Specifically how this declaration would be worded remains to be determined, but the basic idea is that the U.S. would declare that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. A slightly more subtle statement would be to declare that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons only for the purpose of responding to an already launched or imminent nuclear attack. In other words, the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter others from using them.

One might ask what purpose such a declaration would serve? While the more sensible position is that any use of nuclear weapons would be unjustifiable, the proponents of holding such weapons have included deterrence of even conventional war as one of the reasons for their existence. A no-first-use declaration would deny this justification. It would affirm that the consequences of nuclear war would be so horrific that no rational actor would use nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack.

A no-first-use declaration by the U.S. could lead to a number of consequences or follow-up actions:

  1. Other nuclear powers could follow suit, affirming that they, too, would never initiate a nuclear war. This would make the world safer.
  2. A no-first-use declaration would inform the development of so-called battle field or tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons are designed to be used in a conventional conflict. No first use would mean that these weapons serve no purpose, since they could never be used. Especially if all nuclear powers agreed on no first use, an agreement to dismantle tactical nuclear weapons could follow. Funds to develop such weapons would also be saved.
  3. If no first use became part of the internationally accepted rules of the game for nuclear weapons, countries lacking such weapons might lose interest in developing them. If the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear strike, they are not needed if all those holding nuclear weapons affirm that they would never engage in a first strike against a country without nuclear weapons. Moreover, acquiring nuclear weapons would not enhance a country’s security if those weapons could never be used to respond to a non-nuclear attack.
  4. A no first use declaration would make it clear that there is no justification for holding nuclear weapons. If all countries could agree to mutually dismantle them, all would be better off. The risks of accidental war and the expense of maintaining these weapons would be saved. Such a declaration could help start a shift in thinking whereby acquiring nuclear weapons might be perceived as a liability rather than an asset. Although it would not guarantee nonproliferation, it would be a step in the right direction.

No-first-use could be mandated by legislation but a presidential declaration would go a long way. It is something that President Biden could do on his own. It could make the world safer, and there is little if any downside. A presidential declaration would not be inconsistent with legislation that mandates no first use. It is possible that such a declaration would help in reining in countries like North Korea and Iran; it certainly could not hurt in this respect.

Specific requests:

  1. President Biden should issue a no-first-use declaration, via executive order. The executive order could include follow-up instructions for the Defense Department. The no-first-use declaration might be issued as a temporary measure pending further clarification and elaboration in a new nuclear posture review.
  2. The Executive Order should direct the Defense Department to conduct a new nuclear posture review, last done in Feb. 2018. This time, the nuclear posture review should be done with public input. Perhaps there should be some hearings and opportunity to submit written comments in advance, then circulation of a draft for public comment, and then a revised version.
  3. All of this can be done by the Biden administration without any congressional action. Of course, members of Congress should be encouraged to weigh in on the public comment process. But nothing in Congress needs to happen in order for progress to be made on a new nuclear posture review.

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